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GRASS ROOTS PROCEDURE: LOCAL
ADVISORY GROUPS AND THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1990
Lauren K Robel*
I think it important that the groups illustrate that the federal courts
are not the exclusive domain of the district judges. They belong to
all of us and each of us has a responsibility to make them work as
effectively for people as is possible.'

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether federal civil justice needs reform
at all appears to have been overtaken and, perhaps, rendered
moot, by current events. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
("CJRA" or "Act") mandated that one version of civil justice
reform occur in every trial district in the country.2 Even now,
a Civil Justice Reform Act of 1993 is pending in the House
that would unsettle such longstanding traditions as the American Rule regarding attorneys' fees.? Both the 1990 legislation

"Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. Thanks to Professor Carl Tobias for suggestions on the survey
instrument, and to participants in this Symposium for helpful comments.
' Member, Civil Justice Reform Advisory Group, Survey No. 53 (on file with
the author) (Response to survey described in Part III, infra).
2 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter CJRA1.
I Civil Justice Reform Act of 1993, S. 585, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993). The
bill is sponsored by Senators Grassley and DeConcini. Senator Grassley notes,
"The purpose of our bill . . . is to improve deserving parties' access to the federal
courts by reducing the volume of frivolous cases, to reduce the costs of federal
civil litigation, and to encourage settlement of disputes." Id. at 4. The Act includes
a modified English Rule on attorneys' fees that awards prevailing parties in federal diversity cases reasonable attorneys fees. The bill also includes a modification of
Rule 68 that "allows any party, plaintiff or defendant, to offer a settlement at any
point in the litigation. If the offer is declined and the party receiving the offer
gets a final judgment that is not more favorable then that party is responsible for
the offeror's attorneys fees." Id. Other provisions require a 30 day notice period
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and the proposed bill reopen the question of who should be
involved in designing and enforcing whose vision of "reform."
The tradition of our recent history, at least since 1938, left
federal civil procedural innovation firmly in the hands of the
"judiciary and their expert advisors," with only intermittent,
if disquieting, interest in the details from Congress.' The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") were drafted by
a group of elite lawyers, judges and academics,' and the drafters have remained those at the top of the profession ever since.
Even the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, intended to open the process up, relied on a very weak administrative
law model of notice and comment.7 The rulemakers were told
to listen, but they retained the power to ignore.
Congress has come close to exploding this model in the
CJRA. Indeed, the very existence of the CJRA is testimony to
the Congress' new interest in the details of procedural justice
in the federal courts. As first proposed, the legislation would
have required federal trial districts to adopt a host of case
management and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures,8 and it was only through the determined lobbying of the
Judicial Conference, the judges themselves and, eventually, the
organized bar that the judiciary managed to regain control of
the actual implementation of reform in the courts.'

before suit is filed and would limit opinion evidence on the same issue to one
expert for each party.
' Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 375, 379 (1993); see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
5 For example, Congress subjected the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence to
two years of review, and made considerable changes in them before enacting them.
See generally WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND PossBiLrriEs 60-61 (1981). Brown noted that after

the controversy surrounding the evidence rules, "Congress went on to examine at
length, and make major and detailed revisions in, criminal rules submitted in
1974 and habeas corpus amendments submitted in 1976." Id. at 3.
6 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1045-46 (1982); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Dedine, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 498-501 (1986).
" See The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988) (requiring open meetings of the Advisory Committees, periods of public comment and
public hearings on proposed rules changes).
8 See S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
For a description of this lobbying effort, see Lauren K Robel, The Politics of
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The argument over control of rulemaking between the
0
legislature and the courts, however, is an old one.' A more
novel aspect of the CJRA is its creation of ninety-four district
court advisory groups charged with reinventing procedures at
the trial court level." Congress' decision in the CJRA to decentralize procedural decisions is particularly startling when one
foray into local proceduralism was to
remembers that its last
2
it.
curtail
to
attempt
These local Advisory Groups have changed the dynamics of
civil justice reform at the national level in a number of important ways. First, members of these groups have unprecedented
access to information about the federal district courts, and
have been legislatively charged with investigating local practices, thereby opening the courts to new public scrutiny. While
13
their power is constrained by the legislation, their charge is
as broad as can be imagined: to decrease cost and delay in the
Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115, 128 (1991).
10 See, e.g., CHARLES W. GRAU, JUDIcIAL RULEMAKING: ADMINISTRATION, ACCESS
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 7-23 (1978); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULEMAKING PROCEDURES 77-89 (1977). That the division of authority over rules be-

tween the legislature and the courts still generates controversy is evidenced by the
strong claims made by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the response of the
testifying judges to those claims. Compare The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-75 (1990) (claiming Congressional power to
enact procedural legislation) [hereinafter Hearings] with Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77
MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993). I have argued elsewhere that Congress had the power
to enact the CJRA. See Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 45 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
n 28 U.S.C. §§ 472, 478 (Supp. IV 1992).
12 See The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). A reaction to the proliferation of local rules under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83, the legislation requires "appropriate public notice and an opportunity
to comment" to precede the adoption of local rules, 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b), formalizes
a system of review of local district court rules by judicial councils within a circuit,
and authorizes those councils to abrogate local rules inconsistent with Federal
Rules. Id. § 2071(c)(1). A coordinate amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988) requires
the judicial councils to perform a substantive review of these rules. See Id. §
332(d). Finally, the statute provides that it is the exclusive avenue for prescribing
local rules, which is an attempt to avoid the promulgation of the equivalents of
local rules under other rubrics, such as "standing orders." Id. § 2071(f) comment
(1988).

13 For instance, despite the claims of some groups to the contrary, I have argued that the CJRA does not give local courts the power to disregard the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") in the name of expense and delay reduction. See Robel, supra note 9.
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federal trial courts. The breadth of their charge and their consequent investigations may give them strong persuasive authority in matters of court reform. 4 Second, the creation of
local groups destabilizes and, perhaps, revitalizes debate on
civil justice by adding a babylon of new voices to the familiar
group of organized interests which have dominated discussions
of court reform. 5 For instance, the insurance industry, the
plaintiffs' bar and the organized business community all have
familiar substantive agendas that involve interests in various
procedural changes, such as the contraction or protection of
discovery. But the local Advisory Groups do not necessarily
owe allegiances to any of these familiar visions of civil justice
reform.
Finally, the Advisory Groups are an unpredictable wildcard in the relationship between Congress and the judiciary.
Traditionally, the judiciary has argued that Congress lacks the
expertise to craft the rules and management practices that
might improve the performance of the federal courts. 6 The
Judicial Conference and individual judges strenuously argued
this view in the hearings that preceded the enactment of the
CJRA, and they were successful in convincing the Senate Judiciary Committee to back away from its original proposal.17 But
underlying the CJRA was a more-than-implicit accusation that
the judiciary was not serious about improving its performance
and that its arguments were self-interested and not quite to be
trusted.'"
14 Newspapers

are beginning to be interested in the reports of the Advisory
Groups. See R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Re.
form Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PrIT. L. REV. 687, 696-700 (1993) (describing newspaper interest in accounts of pending cases required by the legislation).
'" See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at
War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931 (1993) (noting role
of the ABA, Council on Competitiveness and other groups in civil justice debates);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659
(1993) (same).
1 This view of expertise finds clear expression in the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1988), and was supported by commentators such as Judge
Weinstein. See supra note 10.
17 See generally Hearings, supra note 10, at 73-75.
18 The legislative history is full of acrimony on this point. Evidence in the
legislation of this view includes the "Enhancement of Judicial Information Dissemination" section, 28 U.S.C. § 476, which requires public reporting on a judge-byjudge basis of motions and bench trials that have been pending for over six
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Thus, Congress will be interested in the work product of
all these Advisory Groups in determining how seriously the
judiciary is responding to the CJRA's mandate. Early Advisory
Group reports suggest that the judiciary has gained allies in
pursuit of its goals for the administration of justice (such as
increased funding and more expeditious appointment of judges). 9 Indeed, based on their investigations, many of the
groups have taken positions that strongly support views expressed by the judiciary in opposition to the CJRA.2° However,
there are also early suggestions that many judges have ignored
the recommendations of these groups without explanation, or
undermined implementation of the plans through noncompliance.2 To the extent that such noncompliance occurs, the
judges leave themselves open to the charge that was levelled
through the CJRA: that they are to blame for excessive cost
and delay.22

months and the names of cases that have been pending for over three years. See
Dessem, supra note 14, at 696-700 (describing newspaper interest in accounts of
pending cases required by the legislation).
" Districts are required to implement plans by the end of 1993. Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, § 103(b), 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992). Those districts
that completed the process by the end of 1991 became "Early Implementation
District Courts," and received certain funding benefits. CJRA § 103(c), 28 U.S.C. §
471 (Supp. II 1992). This Article relies primarily on the reports of those early districts.
20 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT REPORT, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION AND PILOT COURTS 16-19 (June 1, 1992) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS]
(noting variety of recommendations from groups to Congress, including speedier
filling of judicial vacancies, concerns about the "federalization" of criminal prosecutions; impact of Speedy Trial Act); CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, REPORT TO CONGRESS (May 27,
1993) [hereinafter E.D. PENN. REPORT] (noting that in its report the Advisory
Group had "criticized the failure of Congress and the Executive Branch to fill
existing vacancies in a timely fashion" and had "called for oversight hearings by
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to review the appointment process").
The Pennsylvania report also criticizes the funding level for the judiciary, noting
that funding through fiscal October 1, 1992, is "13% lower than the request of the
Judicial Conference" and that Congress failed to appropriate enough money to pay
either civil juries (resulting in the suspension of civil jury trials in that district) or
criminal defense attorneys for indigents). Id. at 16-19.
21 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
The judiciary clearly viewed the CJRA as an insulting suggestion that Congress viewed judges as inefficient and uninterested in case management. See
Robel, supra note 9, at 115. One judge told me after the CJRA was enacted, "Being told you're inefficient by Congress is like being told you're ugly by a toad."
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While the Advisory Groups are unsettling the national
picture, the local nature of the groups raises a different set of
questions. As mentioned above, attention has been focused on
whether Congress' entry into civil justice reform presents the
specter of procedure through interest group politics." But local
Advisory Groups present the possibility of grass roots politics-a return to the era when local bars controlled local
courts, not only through direct barriers to foreign entry, but
through the arcane nature of local procedure and practice.24
The composition of the groups, which may make them wellsuited for identifying local problems, could also leave these
groups ill-suited to consider the effect of their recommendations on those with multi-district practices. For instance, do
local groups consciously consider the costs they might be imposing by choosing to deviate from national procedural norms,
or by imposing idiosyncratic management practices? And, if so,
is their consideration of the costs too self-interested to be trusted?
Moreover, the CJRA's goals of reducing cost and delay in
civil litigation while increasing access to justice require some
of the most difficult and controversial kinds of weighing of
competing policies. The solutions the local groups propose to
address cost and delay are likely to have effects on other important values, such as access to courts. However, the legisla-

"See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75
JUDICATURE 161, 163-65 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 83536 (1991). Professor Mullenix's concerns over Congressional involvement in
rulemaking lead her to conclude that Congress' involvement is unconstitutional,
Mullenix, supra note 10, at 1287, a conclusion with which I disagree. See Robel,
supra note 9. However, Professor Mullenix bolsters her constitutional argument
with a pragmatic one: a concern that Congressional involvement "will irretrievably
politicize federal procedural rulemaking." Mullenix, supra note 10, at 1287.
The ideal of political neutrality in rulemaking has been widely shared. See,
e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2167, 2074-79 (1989).
24 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1015, 1040-42 (1982) (describing the difficulties faced by practitioners with
multi-state practices in negotiating the myriad of local practices).
' A good example is the proposal adopted by the Eastern District of Texas to
cap contingency fees. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9-10 (Dec. 20,
1991). The Texas court announced its goal in capping attorneys fees as cutting the
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tion does not require that the groups be constituted in ways
that assure that they are representative of various viewpoints.
Have the groups in fact been constituted with sensitivity to the
need for diverse viewpoints?
The direction that the groups take depends in turn on how
members view their role. Are they representatives of particular
client groups-or even types of practice-entitled to assert
those interests to gain systemic benefits for their clients? Do
they view their role as a public service in which professional
values of access to justice, support of the courts and efficient
court administration are their goals? And, if so, does eschewing
politics mean that the groups will settle on such a mild, consensus-oriented approach to their task that they accomplish
nothing of value?
Finally, the legislation imposes some obligations on the
groups for which attorneys may have little expertise, such as
docket analysis or making causal determinations about cost
and delay. Have the groups been sensitive to their limitations
in these areas?
Part I of this Article examines the genesis of the legislative history and statutory framework of the CJRA. Part II then
assesses how the Advisory Groups have approached their work.
Finally, Part III reports the results of a nationwide survey of
Advisory Group members. The survey was undertaken to answer some of the questions suggested above, as well as to obtain basic information about Advisory Groups: Who are the
members? What are their practice areas? How do they view
their roles? And what is their assessment of their task: was it
completed successfully, or was it worth doing at all?
I.
A.

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ADVISORY GROUPS
The Legislative History
The impetus for the CJRA was a Brookings Institution

cost of civil litigation. But the decision involves,
ing a number of substantive policies, including
cannot pay hourly rates and the effect of such
services. I do not believe that the Texas cap is
Robel, supra note 9.

or at least should involve, weighaccess to attorneys for those who
a cap on the availability of legal
authorized by the legislation. See
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Task Force ("Task Force") report, Justice for All, which addressed the issue of cost and delay in federal civil litigation at
the request of Senator Joseph Biden." The Task Force was
numerically dominated by past or present corporate counsel,27
and the report focused on discovery reform, increased use of
ADR and control of lawyers through strong judicial case management practices and mandatory deadlines as the keys to
increasing federal court efficiency.28 The Task Force recommended that Congress require the adoption of a number of
case management practices in each trial district, and require
each district to adopt a Civil Justice Reform Plan explaining
how it intended to put those practices into action. It also
recommended the creation of local planning groups, with representation from "the Bench, the Public, and the Bar.""
Since the Task Force did not believe that its recommended
changes should be discretionary, it did not view the planning
groups as architects of the basic contours of a Civil Justice
Reform Plan. Rather, its view was
that the wide participation of those who use and are involved in the
court system in each district would not only maximize the prospects
that workable plans will be developed, but would also stimulate a
much-needed dialogue between the bench, the bar, and client com-

munities about methods for streamlining litigation practice."

Much of the Task Force's analysis of delay and cost was premised on an assumption that the judges and lawyers who pre26 Robel, supra note 9, at 117.
27 Id. Corporate counsel comprised a quarter of the Task Force's membership.
28 Id. at 126; see BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS

AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989).
29 BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 12.

Id.
In developing its plan, each district court should include in its planning
group a representative magistrate in the district, public representatives,
and lawyers practicing in firms and corporations representing each of the
major categories of litigants in the district. The planning groups may
vary in their membership, therefore, from district to district.

30

Id.
I3 Id. "Client community" participation would, almost necessarily, involve only
certain kinds of clients-most likely businesses that are repeat litigants-because
many kinds of clients, such as social security claimants, for instance, have no
obvious representatives. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974)
(arguing that repeat litigants have incentives to be involved in rule-seeking behavior that sporadic litigants do not).
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sumably control the litigation had no serious interest in making litigation cheaper and quicker.32 Thus, the Task Force
hoped that planning groups would provide local support for the
concepts of strong case management, discovery control and
ADR, and insure that those concepts were put into action by
opening the courts up to scrutiny by those outside the system,
notably "client communities."
The earliest version of the legislation tracked the recommendations of the task force, including the recommendation
that the strategies of delay and cost control it identified be
made mandatory in all districts.3 Senator Biden described the
role of local courts as "filling in the specifics,"

4

and the role of

local planning groups as "the best way to ensure district-wide

35
solidarity for improving the civil justice system." The inclu-

sion of local groups at first appears to be in some tension with
the insistence of the bill's supporters that its provisions be
made mandatory in each district. But the role for local groups
envisioned by the supporters was primarily to ensure that
there would be a group of court outsiders invested in the outcome of civil justice reform, and that the people who were
responsible for cost and delay (lawyers and judges) would be
36
made locally answerable to the "users of the system."
Robel, supra note 9, at 117.
The Civil Justice Reform Act, S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Hearings, supra note 10, at 2.
' See Hearings, supra note 10, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Biden).
Senator Biden stated that the bill combines what the experts consider "to be the
essential ingredients for a comprehensive reform program." Based on the principle
that true reform can only be achieved if it proceeds from the "bottom up" rather
than the "top down," the legislation requires every federal district court to develop
a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan.
The legislation identifies the chief components that must be in each plan, but
leaves it to every district and every district court to fill in the specifics of the
plan based on its own particular needs. See Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users Unite&" The
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 110 (1991)
(Advisory Group creates "a partnership among the members of the court, the bar,
and the community that the court serves").
I5
Id.
3'See Hearings, supra note 10, at 37 (Statement of Bill Wagner, Wagner
Cunningham, Vaughan and McLaughlin and immediate past president, Association
of Trial Lawyers of America):
CommitA feature that I think is important is that the Advisory
tee that is required by this plan is an Advisory Committee that is a
broad-based advisory committee. It is not the judges and the clerks sitting down and coming up with a plan. It is a plan that is created by the
32
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In the face of strong judicial opposition to the mandatory
nature of the bill, Senator Biden eventually backed down. The
strategies of delay and cost reduction identified in the legislation are now discretionary, except in a limited number of pilot
and demonstration districts. This change probably increased
the importance of the Advisory Groups. When the federal trial
districts evaluate and adopt the required "Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans,"" it is the Advisory
Group's recommendations, rather than Congress', that are the
immediate standard against which the districts must choose.
B.

The Statutory Framework

As noted, the CJRA requires that each federal district
court implement a "civil justice expense and delay reduction
plan" to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the

users of the system, which includes the judges and the clerks and the
prosecutors and the public defenders, and those persons. But it also includes corporate representatives. It includes insurance company representatives. It includes the users of the system to have a hands-on development of their experience of what they need to work with.
Id.; see also Statement of Patrick Head, member of the Task Force (testifying in
favor of S. 2027). Mr. Head was strongly in favor of the bill because it would increase procedural uniformity among districts, a result that he said was important
to the corporation of which he was general counsel, since it is involved in litigation throughout the country. Hearings, supra note 10, at 22 (Statement of Patrick
Head, Vice President and General Counsel of FMC Corporation). However, he
spoke in support of a role for local planning groups as a way to ensure that responsibility for reforming the system was distributed among those who use the
system, including litigants.
' The legislation provides for the designation of "demonstration" and "pilot"
courts. CJRA § 104, 28 U.S.C. §,4071 (Supp. IV 1992). The district courts for the
Western District of Michigan and the Northern District of Ohio were designated to
demonstrate systems of differentiated case management. The district courts for the
Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia and the
Western District of Missouri were designated to demonstrate with various other
methods of reducing cost and delay. The Act further required the Judicial Conference to name 10 "pilot courts" that, under CJRA § 105, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV
1992), are required to include in their plans the provisions included in 28 U.S.C. §
472(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The Judicial Conference has designated the Southern District of California, the District of Delaware, the Northern District of Georgia, the
Southern District of New York, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Tennessee, the Southern District
of Texas, the District of Utah and the Eastern District of Wisconsin. REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 1.
38 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-72 (Supp. IV 1992).
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merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."39 The plan is to be the product of cooperation between
judges and the groups who use the courts. Therefore, courts
must convene Civil Justice Reform Advisory Groups composed
4°
of lawyers, litigants and the local United States Attorney.
The judges control the group's membership. The statute directs
only that the Advisory Group "shall be balanced and include
attorneys and other persons who are representative of major
categories of litigants in [each] court, as determined by the
chief judge of [the] court."4 '
Each Advisory Group is charged with completing "a thorough assessment of the state of the court's civil and criminal
dockets."42 In this context, the statute requires the Group to
render a number of judgments about the efficiency of the court,
including determining "the condition of the civil and criminal
dockets,"43 identifying "trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on court resources" and identifying "the
45
principle causes of cost and delay in civil litigation." It also
requires the Group to "examine the extent to which costs and
assessment of the impact
delays could be reduced by a better
46
of new legislation on the courts."
The legislation, however, provides no guidance about how
to identify and evaluate cost and delay, nor does it tell Advisory Groups how to assess whether cost and delay are excessive.
While the legislation directs the Groups to give special consideration to "such potential causes as court procedures and the
ways in which litigants and their attorneys approach and conduct litigation,"4 the recipe for excessive cost and delay could
have any number of ingredients, including lawyers' case management habits, the court's managerial skills or values, clients'
4
expectations, legislation passed by Congress " and decisions by

Id.
Id.
41 Id.
4' Id.
"
"

§ 471.
§§ 478(b), (d).
§ 478(b).
§ 472(c)(1).

43Id. § 472(c)(1)(A).
"' Id. § 472(c)(1)(B).
41 Id. § 472(c)(1)(C).
46 Id. § 472(c)(1)(D).
4 Id. § 472(c)(1)(C).
48 For instance, many judges have complained that the Sentencing Reform Act
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the Executive Branch.49 Moreover, the causal relationship between any of these factors and perceived problems in a particular district is unlikely to be clear. Thus, the legislation
imposes on the Advisory Groups a task that has often stymied
social scientists. 0
Nevertheless, once this evaluation is complete, the Advisory Group must prepare a report to the court containing its
assessment of the extent of excessive cost and delay, what
reduction measures the court should adopt and whether the
court should develop a plan or select a model plan.5 ' In making its recommendations, the Advisory Group is required to
consider, but not to adopt, six "principles and guidelines of
litigation management and cost reduction" and six "litigation
management and cost and delay reduction techniques."52 The

of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988), dramatically increased their workload. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
137 (Apr. 2, 1990) (reporting ninety percent of judges responding to a survey
found that the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated under this legislation made
sentencing more time consuming). Several CJRA Reports echo this complaint. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 17. Two Advisory Groups (Idaho and the
Southern District of West Virginia) recommended repeal of the Guidelines. For an
interesting analysis of this problem, see Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost
Analysis of The Sentencing Reform Act: Recalling the Virtues of Delegating Complex
Decisions, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659 (1992).
4"See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA, REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ADVISORY GROUP (1993) (noting that
large numbers of narcotics charges involving small amounts of narcotics had been
filed in., district, impeding court's ability to decide civil cases); see also Richard
Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:Recommendations for Reform, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 484-506 (discussing executive decision to drop thousands of
people from the Social Security Disability rolls, and the effect on federal courts).
5" The National Center for State Courts has done extensive research in causes
of delay. See, e.g., John Goerdt, Examining Court Delay: The Pace of Litigation, in
26 URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1989); BARRY MAHONEY, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL
COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS
(1988). Making determinations about what causes delay, or even what constitutes
delay, requires a theory of appropriate case processing time and a method of distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate case development. See Mary
Lee Luskin, Building a Theory of Case Processing Time, 62 JUDICATURE 114, 116
(1978).
" 28 U.S.C. § 472(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
52 28 U.S.C. §§ 473(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1992). The sections require the district
court, in consultation with the Advisory Group, to consider the techniques, principles and guidelines. In order to make useful recommendations, it follows that the
Advisory Group must also consider the suggestions in the statute.
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court must then consider the report and adopt a plan.53 With
the exception of a limited number of demonstration and pilot
courts, however, the CJRA leaves ultimate control over the
content of that plan in the judiciary.'

II. ADVISORY GRoUPS AT WORK
Chief Judges have taken three approaches to appointing
Advisory Groups. Most groups are made up primarily of attorneys, with one or two "public members"-laypersons whose role
in the Groups will be explored below. But some courts have
ignored laypersons, selecting only attorneys." A relatively
small number have split appointments between attorneys and
non-attorneys. 6 Judges and magistrates usually participate in
the groups, either as full members (sometimes as Chairs) or ex
officio.
While the Advisory Groups have little actual power, their
work in fulfilling their statutory tasks puts them in a position
to be strong persuaders. For instance, in fulfilling the docket
assessment function, Advisory Group members have had unparalleled access to inside information about local courts. The
Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts have been marshalled to provide detailed
statistical information about caseload.57 Many of the Groups

28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992).

See, e.g., id. § 472 (requiring district judges to implement plans); id. § 474(a)
(requiring judicial circuit committees to review plans); id. § 474(b) (requiring Judicial Conference to review plans).
€ See, e.g., Delaware (response to surveys).
' See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA (Sept. 30, 1991) [hereinafter
GEORGIA REPORT] (Seven of eighteen members were non-attorneys, including an

AFL-CIO president, a retired textile executive, a vice-president of a bank, a director of the NAACP and the director of the Georgia Poultry Federation; of the remaining members, one was a legal aid attorney, three were corporate counsel, one
a clerk of the court, one the United States Attorney, one the State Attorney General and the remaining four attorneys were in private practice); REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF

WYOMING (1991) (4 of 14 were members non-attorneys, including members labeled
representatives of communications, agriculture, oil, coal, education and railroad
industries) [hereinafter WYOMING REPORT].
11 The Administrative Office releases substantial statistical information each
year. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL

REPORT (1991). In addition, the Administrative Office and the Federal Judicial
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have surveyed or interviewed lawyers and, less successfully,
litigants about their litigation experiences within the district.5" Most have interviewed the judges, magistrates, court
clerks and even the judges' room clerks about their case management practices.5 9 Many have held public forums to discuss
local litigation practices." The legislation itself requires public
reports twice yearly of each judge's record of disposing of pending motions and bench trials,6 ' and the Groups have examined
those reports.6 2 Groups also report having undertaken literature reviews and hiring consultants to make sense of the statistical information they were amassing.'
The Groups are also charged with evaluating each of the
case management strategies, ADR proposals and discovery
control mechanisms listed in the statute in light of local conditions, and with making recommendations with respect thereto
that "ensure" that the court, litigants and attorneys all make
"significant contributions" towards delay and cost reduction."
Groups report spending daunting amounts of time discussing
and evaluating these proposals.65 The results of all this investigation and brainstorming are typically written up in a report-often lengthy-that
is publicly available' and present67
court.
district
the
to
ed

Center have provided extensive information to the Advisory Groups, tailored to
each district. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS AND
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDANCE TO ADVISORY GROUPS APPOINTED UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (Feb. 1991).
58-See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at Exhibit A.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 3.
61 28 U.S.C. § 476 (Supp. IV 1992).
62 The reports of the Advisory Group for the District of Massachusetts and the
Advisory Group for the Southern District of Indiana disclose pending motions and
bench trials by individual judges.
63 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at Exhibit A.
64

28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).

65

Thirty-five percent of the respondents estimated spending ten hours or more

on Advisory Group business each month during 1991.
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 472(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
As noted earlier, the report has a number of other audiences, including Congress.
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SURVEY RESULTS

I sent surveys to 485 members of twenty-six Advisory
Groups. 8 The groups included three pilot courts and two
demonstration districts. All but one of the Groups were Early
Implementation Districts; that is, they have already completed
69
reports, and their courts have adopted plans. The Groups
ranged in size from fifty-four members to eleven members;
70
most of the groups had fewer than twenty members. Forty
7
percent (194) of the members returned completed surveys.
A. Advisory Group Membership
Who sits on the advisory groups?72 Despite the hopes of
the Brookings Task Force, all but fourteen of the respondents
were attorneys or judges. 3 Of the attorneys, all but thirteen
reported being in practice for over ten years, and ninety had
74
been in practice for over twenty years. The relative seniority
of the attorneys responding may account in part for the poor
representation of women and minority members in the Groups,
although it hardly excuses it.75 Of the twenty-six Groups, only

The complete survey, with percentages and frequencies of responses, is attached as an appendix. All references to survey questions and responses are to
that appendix.
, See supra text accompanying note 19.
" Fourteen had fewer than 20; seven had between 20-30.
71 In all of the Groups, at least 25% of the members to whom I sent surveys
responded.
72 To answer this question, I relied on both survey responses and lists of Advisory Group members included in Advisory Group reports. I ran names of Group
members through Westlaw's database on practitioners ("West's Legal Directory") in
order to check information about practice areas. Search of WESTLAW, West's
Legal Directory Database, Private Practice Directory (Dec. 1, 1993).
7' Survey Question No. IIIA. This small number is due to two factors: first,
from the lists of members included in the Advisory Group's reports, it is clear that
there are relatively few non-attorneys on any of the advisory groups; second, I had
more difficulty finding addresses for non-attorneys than for attorneys, who are
usually listed in Westlaw's database. However, even assuming that all of the persons listed in the reports as group members who do not appear in the Westlaw
database are non-attorneys, only very small numbers of non-attorneys sit on the
Goups.
", Survey Question No. III.B.
See also NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE EFFECTS OF GENDER

71

IN THE FEDERAL CoURTS 26 n.1 (1993) (noting that of 1721 people appointed nation-wide to CJRA Advisory Groups, 277 (or 16%) were women).
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seven had memberships that included twenty percent women;
one Group had no women members.76 Only seventeen percent
77
of the survey respondents identified themselves as women.
Membership in a minority group could not, of course, be identified by looking at the lists of members. However, only eleven
(5.6%) of the survey respondents described themselves as members of minority groups. 8
The largest number of respondents (119 or 61%) worked in
law firms, 79 but there was considerable diversity in the size of
the firms. Seventeen percent worked in firms of fifty or more
attorneys; of these, eleven percent were in firms of 100 or more
attorneys. Twenty-six percent worked in firms of under ten
attorneys. 0 Only five of the respondents (2.6%) identified
themselves as corporate counsel and only four (2.1%) as with
public interest groups or legal services. Eleven (6%) were judges.81 Although respondents came from many practice areas,
the largest number of the respondents (47%) (as well as the
largest number of Chairs) described the "predominate nature
of [their] practice" as "general civil litigation,"82 with the next
largest group being "torts and insurance" (17%).83 Large areas
of federal practice were not well represented. Only six people
identified their practice areas as civil rights, only three as
natural resources or environmental law, only three as patent,
trademark or copyright, five as bankruptcy, and none as immigration. More people identified their practice areas as probate
and trusts (9) or real estate (7) than these more traditional

" The District of Wyoming listed its membership in its report, WYOMING REPORT, supra note 56, along with the constituency that each members represented.
Along with representatives of the coal, agriculture and communications industries,
the report listed one member as "Representative/Female Attorney." There was
another woman member; she was not an attorney and represented education.
Survey Question No. III.I; Seven percent did not respond to the question on
gender. Id.
28 Survey Question No. III.J.
Survey Question No. III.B.
s Survey Question No. III.C.1.

Survey Questions No. II.C.2-.4.

82 Ninety-one respondents

(47%) chose that label; fourteen of 22 Chairs re-

sponding chose that label. Survey Question No. IlI.D.
8' Two of the Chairs described their practices as predominately torts and insurance; the remaining Chair who identified a practice area chose criminal law. The
third largest group was labor/employment with 18 (9.3%). Survey Question No.

III.D.
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areas of federal practice.'
Most of these attorneys are active in federal court litigation. Almost 40% were in federal court in at least half of their
cases, and another 19% were in federal court in at least 25% of
their cases. 5 Moreover, a majority of the respondents are active in other bar service activities. Sixty-two percent reported
that they served on other state and local bar committees, and
forty-one percent serve on other court committees. 6 Twentyeight percent reported service on national bar committees.
Generally, then, it appears that judges have chosen primarily
litigators who appear frequently before them, many of whom
are already active in bar service activities, to serve on the
Groups."7
Of those in private civil practice, about 21% reported that
they represent primarily plaintiffs, 25% reported representing
primarily defendants and 19% reported they represented equal
numbers of each. This balance suggests that courts have been
sensitive to the differing views that the plaintiffs' and
defendants' bar bring to substantive issues.8 8 Given the relative lack of diversification by practice area, or gender and ethnicity, it may also suggest that courts have viewed this criterion as the most important to achieving balance on the Groups.
The CJRA's drafters hoped that Advisory Groups would be
constituted of people who "live with the civil justice system on
a regular basis," 9 both because they use the courts frequently
as lawyers, and because their interests are regularly decided in

8

Id.

In keeping with the notion that family matters do, not generally end up

in federal court, see Judith Resnik, Revising the Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching
Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1993), only two of the respondents identified
family law as the predominate nature of their practice. Id.
85 Survey Question No. III.F.
88

Survey Question No. IH.G. Twenty percent serve on their district court's

Local Rules Committee. Id.
' Interestingly, relatively few of the Group members report having served as
law clerks. Eleven percent have served as clerks in their districts; 2% as law
clerks in another district; 4% as clerks at a federal appellate court; and 7% as
clerks in the state courts. Survey Question No. III.H.
, Within specific Groups, answers to the question, "If you are in private civil
practice, do you represent primarily plaintiffs, primarily defendants or about the
same [of each]?" varied widely. In some Groups, none of my respondents represented plaintiffs; in some, none represented defendants. Survey Question No. III.E.
89 See 136 CONG. REC. S416 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
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the courts. The hope of the drafters was that client representatives would act as a check on the tendency of court insiders to
stay with the status quo. But these survey responses suggest
that while the Groups include many people who regularly
practice in the federal courts, they exclude many traditional
areas of federal practice and, as discussed below, many litigants.
B. The Role of Non-Attorneys
The Brookings Institution Task Force and the supporters
of the CJRA in the Congress envisioned that the local advisory
groups would include significant participation from the "client
community."' For the most part, this goal has not been
achieved in the Early Implementation Districts. Very few of
the Groups include significant numbers of non-attorney members;9 most had only one or two lay members, and several had
none. Even when Groups did have litigant participants, many
respondents with those Groups reported that they did not,
suggesting
that the litigants had not had much of a pres92
ence.

Significant numbers of respondents questioned the role of
non-attorneys in the Groups. Thirty-two percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement, "Litigant participation
was helpful because it brought an important perspective to
deliberations that attorneys could not provide."93 Several respondents stated in written comment that lay members were
unnecessary because "the lawyers in our Advisory Group repre10136 CONG. REC. S416 (statement of Sen. Coats); GEORGIA REPORT, supra
note 56.
9'See GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 56 (in Advisory Group of 18 members, 7
are non-attorneys, including a retired textiles industry executive, a bank vice-president, a representative from Atlanta city government, the president of the Georgia
AFL-CIO, the director of the Georgia Poultry Federation, the director of the
NAACP and a foundation trustee; of the remaining attorneys, three were corporate
counsel, one was a legal aid director, and one was a clerk of the court); WYOMING
REPORT, supra note 56, (Advisory Group of fourteen members, six of whom are
non-attorneys, including representatives of communications, agriculture, oil, coal,
railroad and education industries).
92 Respondents on seven Groups either reported that they did not know whether non-attorneys had been included in the Group, or erroneously reported that
they had not been so included.
" Survey Question No. 1.1.2.
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sented a broad range of litigant groups."94 Yet others complained about the lack of input from non-attorneys, with one
noting that the Group would have accomplished more had they
involved people with businesses who knew what it cost to be
sued." One of the litigant-respondents commented on his/her
role:
I was able to express my views and concerns for reform from a
litiganfs perspective. My recommendations were openly received by
the Advisory Group and several were implemented into our district's
plan. [S]everal of the issues we addressed would not have been discussed or implemented had a litigant not actively participated .....
One of the saddest things about this process was that we originally
started off with several litigants on our committee but I ended up
being the only one who diligently participated. 6

Several respondents noted this lack of participation by lay
members. While it may be that litigants do not participate
because they are unfamiliar with procedures,97 it is also likely
that in most Groups they are so outnumbered by people with
insider expertise that they cannot make a meaningful impact
on the work of the Group.
C.

Themes
1.

The Delicate Dance Between Bench and Bar

Attorney participation helps create a sense of ownership in the system and paves the way for positive cooperative efforts between judges, attorneys, and litigants towards development of the best system
of delivering justice possible."

The primary benefit attributed to the CJRA process was
not a decrease in cost and delay, but opening a dialogue between the court and the bar.9 9 Ninety percent of the respon" Survey No. 36 (on file with the author). Seventy-two percent believed
litigants' interests were well-represented, even if few litigants directly participated
in the Groups. Survey Question No. II.B.
's Survey No. 48 (on file with the author).
96 Survey No. 42 (on file with the author).
9 Sixty-four percent of respondents disagreed that lack of familiarity with
court procedures resulted in litigants not participating. Survey Question 1.1.2.
Survey No. 78 (on file with the author).
" The theme of dialogue between bench and bar is the single most common
positive comment.
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dents agreed that the process "increases attorney understanding of the courts,"' '0 and eighty-one percent believed it "inOf
creases judicial understanding of attorney problems."'
course, in order to have increased judicial understanding, there
must often be criticism. While seventy-five percent of the respondents believed that attorneys could overcome concerns
about candid criticism of the judges before whom they practice,
a significant minority were less certain.10 2
Increased dialogue brings a number of obvious benefits.
First, many respondents reported an increased understanding
of, and support for, a variety of issues of importance to judges,
such as underfunding in the courts and the effect of the criminal docket and sentencing guidelines on the civil docket.0 3
This informed support for issues that have concerned the
bench in turn was translated into direct recommendations to
Congress in a number of Advisory Group reports. For instance,
"many Advisory Groups and courts expressed particular concern over pending legislation that would 'federalize' any crime
committed with a handgun that traveled in interstate commerce." 4' Advisory Group reports also criticized the impact
that the Sentencing Guidelines have had on the courts, with
two Groups going so far as to recommend their repeal.' Many
reports mentioned underfunding as a cause of cost and delay,
and recommended that the courts be given additional resources
0 6 And, vindicatfor law clerks, pro se clerks, and other help."

10

Thirty-five percent strongly agreed. Survey Question No. I.D.1.

101

Survey Question No. II.

1o The question about whether attorneys could be candid before the judges produced more waffling answers than any other. Survey Question No. I.F.8. Many
respondents did not want to be held to a 1-5 scale (1 indicating strong agreement,
4 indicating strong disagreement, and 5 indicating "don't know"), preferring instead
to mark an answer between "agree" and "disagree."
103 Typical comments included:
*"I gained appreciation for the difficulties of managing civil caseloads in the
context of criminal trials." Survey No. 28 (on file with the author).
*"[The CJRA] allows Congress to escape responsibility for responsible decisions about the court system, such as funding." Survey No. 24 (on file with
the author).
*"[In response to question about how process could be improved] Congress
could fund the courts." Survey No. 49 (on file with the author).
104 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 17.
105 Id. (noting that both the District of Idaho and

the Southern District of West
Virginia had recommended repeal of sentencing guidelines).
106 Id. at 18 (recommendations concerning increased funding for personnel); E.D.
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ing a position taken by the Judicial Conference in opposition to
the CJRA, many groups have correctly noted the impact of the
Speedy Trial Act on the civil docket.' °7
However, the increased dialogue between the bench and
bar increases the expectations that the court will, in fact, respond to the recommendations. Eighty-six percent of the respondents agreed that "the court was openminded in considerAt the same
ing the Advisory Group recommendations."'
time, a large number of negative comments concerned the role
of the judiciary in evaluating the reports, adopting plans or
implementing the plans.
Indeed, most attorneys (83%) agreed that the participation
of the bench "was essential in understanding issues [the] group
was asked to address."0 9 Importantly, most also agreed that
the judges did not simply take over the Advisory Groups." '
However, other respondents complained that judges were unwilling to allow the Advisory Group to develop innovative programs: "The judges in our group were really calling the shots,
and few suggestions by lawyers (when the lawyers had the
gumption to make suggestions) survived the drafting process.""' In explaining how the process might have been
improved, a significant number of respondents cited earlier,
and more substantive, involvement by judges:
Judges should have been more deeply incorporated into the
subcommittee deliberations, because they sabotaged a number of
of the process, after sitting more or less
proposed rules at the end
112
quietly until that point.
The process could have been improved by having a greater
frequency of judicial participation in the Advisory Group meetings.
Many issues could have been resolved more quickly by having imme-

PENN. REPORT, supra note 20 (noting failure to fund civil jurors, criminal defense
representation).
Ir" REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 17.

...Survey Question No. II.B. In three of the Groups, half of the respondents
disagreed or strongly disagreed that the court was openminded in considering the
Advisory Group report.
Il

Survey Question No. I.H.I.B.

no Id. Only 10% agreed with the statement "Judges dominated the advisory
group meetings." Id.
. Survey No. 101 (on file with the author). Perceptions of judge interaction
with the Group are one area where the responses differ markedly from Group to

Group.
11

Survey No. 16 (on file with the author).
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diate input from the bench. Occasionally decisions were reached by
the judges on Advisory Group recommendations that were not satisfactorily explained in instances where the judges disagreed with the
recommendations."'

Finally, a number of respondents complained that, while the
court adopted their recommendations, judges were undermining the plans through lack of consistency or lack of support for
the underlying ideas. These comments are typical:
All the group members agreed that for the rules to work and to
be implemented it would require active judicial compliance and involvement. All agreed that for the proposed rules to be meaningful
the district judges and magistrates had to know and employ the
rules. For the most part, there is little or no judicial use of the rule
changes. 1 4It is the same old process with new hoops to jump

through.

Let's see if all judges in our district enforce these rules. I already see that within the first six months of the rules being in efand
fect, some judges are not imbued with the spirit of the rules
5
some follow the rules in a haphazard and slipshod manner."

But because the statute requires an annual assessment of each
plan," 6 if noncompliance with plan provisions is occurring, it
will become evident over time.
In fact, judicial opposition to the CJRA was intense."7
Many judges doubted the need for the legislation, while others
were disturbed by Congress' implication that they were not
doing their jobs. It is predictable, then, that judges may be less
than enthusiastic in their reception of Advisory Group recommendations. But the judiciary controls which of the Advisory
Group recommendations to adopt."' Having chosen to implement plans that adopt Advisory Group recommendations, judges should realize that a lack of enforcement has the potential
to be politically embarrassing if Congress revisits the issues
involved in the CJRA.

Survey No. 104 (on file with the author).
Survey No. 9 (on file with the author).
"' Survey No. 101 (on file with the author).
116 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. IV 1992) (Periodic District Court Assessment).
1
See Robel, supra note 9, at 128; see also Mullenix, supra note 4, at 411-19.
"'
1

11 28 U.S.C. § 474(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992) (the committee shall review the
plan and report and "make such suggestions for additional actions or modified
actions of that district court as the committee considers appropriate").
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2. Resistance to Politics
In our group, there was fairly good balance between plaintiff and
defense bars, large and small firms, public and private sector. This
9
balance was important, as some partisan jockeying occurred."
Only a few "political" items crept into the agenda, such as protective
and non-disclosure orders. These were laid to rest with dispatch."

Most respondents strongly resisted "political" descriptions
of their roles; that is, descriptions that legitimized seeking
favorable rules for particular client constituencies. Seventy-one
percent disagreed with the statement "Attorneys are too interested in rules that favor their clients." 2 ' Seventy-four percent disagreed that "local groups recommend procedures that
favor [the] local bar." "2 And seventy percent disagreed that
"members of the Advisory Group represented their own interests.")A23
An astonishing ninety-four percent agreed that "members
of the Advisory Group were a diverse group of practitioners."124 The written comments suggest that the respondents
felt it was important to assure that the groups were balanced,
primarily along defendant and plaintiff representation lines.
However, statistical analysis of the respondents' attitudes
towards the CJRA process revealed that this is a cohesive
group: there were no statistically significant differences between plaintiffs and defendant's attorneys, for instance, on
any of the answers to the survey questions, nor were there
statistically significant differences in responses by practice
area.12

1

Survey No. 112 (on file with the author).

'
Survey No. 2 (on file with the author). These comments were typical of
written comments by respondents.
121 Survey Question No. I.F.4. Although only 18% characterized their disagreement as strong.
12 Survey Question No. I.F.9.
12 Survey Question No. II.B.
12. Survey Question No. II.B.
1" As noted earlier, some of the practice areas had so few respondents that

meaningful statistical analysis is difficult. Likewise, the number of women made
meaningful statistical analysis of differing attitudes by gender problematic; however, no statistically significant differences appeared between male and female respondents.
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While some individual respondents complained that the
Groups were weighted towards particular types of practice ("I
felt the tone was set by large law firms that represent corporations and defense"), 26 none of the respondents complained
that their Groups had adopted rules that favored particular
groups. And support for the results of the Groups' work was
very high: ninety-one percent of respondents stated that they
"agreed with most of the Advisory Group's recommendations." 7 Moreover, while the respondents for the most part
resisted the notion that members voted for changes that favored one group over another, many noted that as members of
the bar, they have an interest in incremental rather than dramatic change, and they often have an interest in cost and delay:
Many changes 'work against their self-interest. They will not vote to
implement these changes.1"
Unfortunately, because of the consensus nature of large group meetings, proposed changes will be incremental rather than wholesale.
Suggestions to include attorneys' fees under Rule 68, for example... drew audible gasps from
group members who then dismissed
129
the idea without discussion.
Attorneys are more resistant to changes in practices and procedures
than litigants are (but not as resistant as judges). 3 '
I would not like to say this experience has been a complete waste of
time, but I am deeply skeptical of its value to the judicial system. So
long as the CJRA permits lawyers and judges to dominate, reform is
at least very unlikely.131

While seventy-nine percent of respondents disagreed with
the statement "The Advisory Group was too cautious in its
approach to reform," an examination of the reports themselves
suggests, unsurprisingly, that the comments that lawyers are
conservative in their approach to civil justice issues are correct. In the area of ADR, for instance, the most common ap126Survey No. 14 (on file with the author).
12 Survey No. II.B. Only one percent stated that they strongly disagreed with

the recommendations. Id.
128 Survey No. 24 (on file with the author).
1 Survey No. 109 (on file with the author).
130 Survey No. 71 (on file with the author).
131 Survey No. 37 (on file with the author).
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proach taken by the early implementation Groups was to do a
32
little more of whatever it was the court was already doing.'
Resistance to a political view of their roles could well have
meant that subjects viewed as "political" were off-limits ("they
were laid to rest with dispatch").
The one area in which this conservative approach was
abandoned was in the area of discovery. Surprisingly large
numbers of the Groups adopted the mandatory disclosure provisions 3 3 that have proven so extraordinarily controversial as
proposed revisions to Rule 26."M One possible explanation for
this unusual activism might be that the mandatory disclosure
provisions adopted by most of the Groups were modeled after a
proposed amendment to Rule 26 that had been published in
August 1991.131 Thus, Groups may have felt that mandatory
disclosure was inevitable, and should be included in the recommended plans in order to avoid having to rewrite the plans
later to include a new form of discovery that is obviously relevant to the techniques suggested in the CJRA itself. Another
explanation may be found in a memorandum from the Federal
Judicial Center's Director, William Schwarzer, encouraging
Advisory Groups to consider recommending a local rule that
mandated prediscovery disclosure provisions as part of their
plans. 136 The Federal Judicial Center provided technical sup132

REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at

7:

The most common approach to [ADRI was to strengthen an existing
practice by including it in the local rules or by adding requirements. For
example, a number of courts that have encouraged settlement in the past
will now hold settlement conferences in every case, will hold them earlier, and will require attendance by parties or a representative with authority to make binding decisions.
133 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 12 (noting that twenty-one courts
had adopted mandatory disclosure provisions at the time that the report was written). The Report found this high percentage noteworthy because "the Civil Justice
Reform Act neither requires nor suggests [the] use of mandatory disclosure." Id. at
13.
134 See Supreme Court of the United States, Transmittal Letter, reprinted in
113 S. Ct. (Preface) 575 (1993) and dissenting statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) 581, 584-87 (1993); see also Carl Tobias, Collision
Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993) (discussing the relationship between proposed rule and activity of CJRA advisory groups).
1.5

See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF

PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE, PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIviL

PROCEDURE 26, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-88 (1991).
136 FEDERAL JUDICIAL

CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

ACT OF 1990, 16 (Jan. 16, 1991):
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port for the Advisory Groups in a number of ways, including a
document entitled "Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990." Groups may have included mandatory disclosure
provisions simply because they were recommended by the
experts at the Judicial Center responsible for helping them
implement the legislation.
3.

Local v. National Perspectives and Issues of Expertise

There is wide agreement that national uniformity in federal procedural rules is a good idea, despite the difficulty of attaining such uniformity in practice. 3 7 One serious concern
about the proliferation of local groups charged with considering
"such potential causes [of cost and delay] as court procedures ....

."'

is whether such groups are sensitive when

making recommendations to the costs they can impose through
procedural disuniformity.39

Almost thirty percent of the

respondents agreed, in fact, that "attorneys do not weigh [the]
costs of procedural disuniformity between districts" when they
recommend adopting procedures. 4 ° Fewer respondents (20%)
agreed that "attorneys do not weigh costs of procedural
disuniformity between local and federal rules."""
Suggested Local Rule
a. Prediscovery disclosure
Before any party may initiate any discovery, that party must submit
to the opponent (1) the identity of all persons known or believed to have
substantial discoverable information about the claims or defenses, together with a summary of that information; (2) a description, including the
location, of all documents that are reasonably likely to bear substantially
on the claims or defenses; (3) a computation of any damages claimed; (4)
the substance of any insurance agreement that may cover any resulting
judgment; and (5) a copy of any report of an expert who may be called
at trial. The disclosure obligation is reciprocal and continues throughout
the case.
13 The most obvious difficulty has been with local rules promulgated under
Rule 83. See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with
Uniformity, 50 U. PI'r. L. REV. 853 (1989); Stephen Subrin, Federal Rules, Local
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989).
13828 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
139 See Robel, supra note 9; Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and The
Balkanization of Federal Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992).
1" Survey Question No. I.F.2. Nine percent did not know whether they agreed
or disagreed with the statement.
141 Id.
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One way of assuring that Group members are sensitive to
cross-district disuniformity is to make sure that the Groups
include attorneys with multi-state practices. Several of the
Groups reported no members in firms of fifty attorneys or
more. If size is used as a rough proxy for the possibility that a
firm will be involved in cases in other districts, these Groups
may not have any members who would be directly affected by
the problems that are associated with the multiplication of
procedural requirements in different courts.
Respondents also did not appear concerned that they
lacked expertise to "determine who is responsible for cost and
delay,
or to assess the docket." Given the difficulty of
these tasks, this self-assurance may be misplaced. Many
Groups, however, relied on consultants to provide docket assessments and other technical help.
4.

Was the Advisory Group Experience Worthwhile?

The judges who disputed the need for the CJRA would be
heartened by how many of the respondents agreed with
them.' The highest percentage of negative comments were
from respondents expressing frustration with their charge
under the Act. A significant number of the respondents questioned the need for the legislation:
The process was probably more costly than beneficial in our district,
which was not plagued by excessive delays or costs.145

Our local federal court... is filled with strong-willed, hard-working
federal judges who take pride in ensuring efficient, low-cost justice.
They have largely accomplished this result, long before the CJRA.

.4.Only 11% agreed that "attorneys lack expertise to determine who is responsible for cost and delay." Id.
1
Id. Only 10% agreed with the statement "attorneys lack skills necessary to
assess docket."
144 For this section, I excluded comments from judges. This one was typical,
however:
The CJRA was well-intentioned, but based on two false premises: (1)
That all districts have the same problems (we have long gotten the vast
majority of our cases to trial without the CJRA, thank you); (2) docket
problems are the result of lazy federal judges (I work harder now than
when I was a lawyer).
Survey No. 43 (on file with the author).
145 Survey No. 44 (on file with the author).
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The CJRA mandate ignores the possibility that reform was unnecessary in at least some districts. I thought we wasted a lot of time, paper, and government money to produce an unnecessary document
just because the CJRA mandated it.'"

I'm a great believer in "Ifit ain't broke, don't fix it." Civil justice
47
reform has such a nice ring to it, but the system works fine.

Others noted, as had the judges who testified against the
legislation, that an approach to cost and delay that ignored the
criminal docket was unlikely to have much of an effect:
There is little that can be done by the Advisory Group to overcome
the tremendous burdens placed on the court by the criminal docket,
other than to point out the need for more judges, and more spaces
for visiting judges.'48
The problem is that Congress under the CJRA has failed to recognize the fundamental causes of undue expense and delay-the delay
in appointing judges and the priority given the criminal justice system under the Speedy Trial Act. 49

Even the respondents who saw the Advisory Group process as
professionally rewarding still questioned its long-term utility.
This comment was typical:
I found my service a worthwhile opportunity for professional growth.
I am presently agnostic as to whether the CJRA was a good idea. It
is contributing toward disuniformity district by district in the federal rules of civil procedure and I oppose this "balkanization." I remain
open-minded, pending review of the pilot and demonstration districts, whether it will produce off-setting benefits.'
CONCLUSION

The CJRA launched a massive experiment in local
proceduralism, and the results are only now beginning to come
in. In the debate between Congress and the judiciary over who
should control civil justice reform, the results of this experiment are likely to be important. Early returns suggest support
for both sides. Congress will be told through the reports issued
146 Survey

Survey
Survey
'"
149 Survey
15 Survey
17

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

51 (on file with the author).
69 (on file with the author).
112 (on file with the author).
109 (on file with the author).
1 (on file with the author).
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by local Groups that many districts did not need to go through
this exercise. In addition, having invited the groups to lay
responsibility for cost and delay, Congress is learning that
many Groups place the responsibility squarely on its doorstep,
blaming Congressional inaction in judicial appointments and
funding, and blaming statutory requirements that lead to increased demands on the courts.
On the other hand, Congress may well point to the lack of
significant input by non-attorneys as evidence that the Advisory Groups' product was the work of court insiders, rather than
a cooperative effort between the bench, the bar and the public
that Congress envisioned. In any event, the judges risk losing
the benefits of the political capital they have amassed through
this process if they undermine or ignore the Advisory Groups'
recommendations. In this sense, then, the courts may be both
the winners and the losers in the latest round of civil justice
reform.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 879

APPENDIX A
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ADVISORY GROUP
Early Implementation District Survey
I. Experiences on Civil Justice Reform Advisory Group

A. Position on Civil Justice Reform Advisory Group
0. No Response
1. Chair
2. Reporter
3. Member

8
24
15
147

(4.1%)
(12.4%)
(7.7%)
(75.8%)

B. Please estimate the average number of hours you spent each month on Advisory Group work
during 1991.

C. Did your group employ a consultant?
0. No Response
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know

4
80
99
11

(2.1%)
(41.2%)
(51%)
(5.7%)

D. Based on your experience, do you agree or disagree with these statements about the positive
value of attorney participation on Civil Justice Reform Advisory Groups:

1. INCREASES ATTORNEY UNDERSTANDING OF COURTS
Strongly
Agree
68(35.1%)

Agree

106 (54.6%)

Disagree

11(5.7%)

Strongly

3(1.5%)

Don't Know
Disagree

No Response

6(3.1%)

2. INCREASES JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF ATTORNEY PROBLEMS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

No Response

54(27.8%)

103 (53.1%)

23 (11.9%)

5(2.6%)

8(4.1%)

1 (.5%)

3. INCREASES ATT"ORNEY COMPLIANCE WITH COURT PROCEDURES
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

No Response

13 (6.7%)

97 (50.%)

36(18.6%)

3 (1.5%)

42(21.6%)

3 (1.5%)
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4. IMPROVES RESULT IN RULE FORMULATION: RULES ARE SUBSTANTIVELY
BETTER
Strongly
Agree
55 (28.4%)

Agree

94 (48.5%)

Disagree

26 (13.4%)

Strongly
Disagree
4(2.1%)

Don't Know

No Response

15 (7.7%)

5. ATTORNEY PERSPECTIVE WOULD OTHERWISE BE IGNORED
Strongly
Agree
21(10.8%)

Agree

68 (35.1%)

Disagree

81(41.8%)

Strongly
Disagree
8 (4.1%)

Don't Know

13 (6.7%)

No Response

3 (1.5%)

6. LITIGANT PERSPECTIVE WOULD OTHERWISE BE IGNORED
Strongly
Agree

Agree

20 (10.3%

66 (34%)

Disagree

80 (41.2%)

Strongly
Disagree
5 (2.6%)

Don't Know

19 (9.8%)

No Response

4 (2.1%)

E. Are there ways in which attorney participation in Civil Justice Reform Advisory Groups is
valuable that are not recognized in question D? 43 responses

F. Based on your experience, do you agree or disagree with these statements about the negative
effects of attorney participation on Civil Justice Reform Advisory Groups?

1. ATTORNEYS DO NOT TAKE NEEDS OF COURTS INTO ACCOUNT
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

4 (2.1%)

15 (7.7%)

122 (62.9%)

Strongly
Disagree
48 (24.7%)

Don't Know

3 (1.5%)

No Response

2 (1%)

2. ATTORNEYS DO NOT WEIGH COSTS OF PROCEDURAL DISUNIFORMITY
BETWEEN DISTRICTS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

7 (3.6%)

51(26.3%)

91(46.9%)

Strongly
Disagree
24 (12.4%)

Don't Know

No Response

20 (10.3%)

1 (.5%)

3. ATTORNEYS DO NOT WEIGH COSTS OF PROCEDURAL DISUNIFORMITY
BETWEEN LOCAL AND FEDERAL RULES
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

4(2.1%)

35 (18%)

103 (53.1)

Strongly
Disagree
29(14.9%)

Don't Know

23 (11.9%)

No Response
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4. ATTORNEYS ARE TOO INTERESTED IN RULES THAT FAVOR THEIR CLIENTS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

5(2.6%)

42(21.6%)

111 (57.2%)

Strongly
Disagree
32 (16.5%)

Don't Know

No Response

4(2.1%)

5. ATTORNEYS ARE TOO BUSY TO DEVOTE TIME TO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ISSUES
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

3 (1.5%)

26 (13.4%)

112 (57.7%)

Strongly
Disagree
49 (25.3%)

Don't Know

No Response

4 (2.1%)

6. ATTORNEYS LACK SKILLS NECESSARY TO ASSESS DOCKET
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

2 (1%)

18 (9.3%)

103 (53.1%)

Strongly
Disagree
62 (32%)

Don't Know

No Response

9 (4.6%)

7. ATTORNEYS LACK EXPERTISE IN RULES FORMULATION
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

n/a

19(9.8%)

101 (52.1%)

Strongly
Disagree
71(36.6%)

Don't Know

No Response

3 (1.5%)

8. ATTORNEYS WILL NOT BE CANDID WHEN JUDGES ARE PRESENT
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

7 (3.6%)

39 (20.1%)

106 (54.6%)

Strongly
Disagree
39 (20.1%)

Don't Know

2 (1%)

No Response

1 (.5%)

9. LOCAL GROUPS RECOMMEND PROCEDURES THAT FAVOR LOCAL BAR
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

4(2.1%)

37 (19.1%)

105 (54.1%)

Strongly
Disagree
31(16%)

Don't Know

No Response

15 (7.7%)

2(1%)

10. ATTORNEYS LACK EXPERTISE TO DETERMINE WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
DELAY OR COST
Strongly

Agree

Disagree

2 (1%)

Strongly

Don't Know

Disagree

Agree
19 (9.8%)

106 (54.6%)

60 (30.9%)

7 (3.6%)

No Response
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G. Does attorney participation in Civil Justice Reform Advisory Groups have negative effects
not recognized in question F?
H. Please answer the following questions about the participation of judicial officers (district
judges and magistrate judges) on the Advisory Group. 60 responses
1. Were judicial officers members of the Advisory Group?
38.7%
75
a. Yes, they were full members
14.9%
29
b. They were ex officio members
c. They were not members, but attended meetings
i. They always attended meetings
ii. They sometimes attended meetings
d. They were not members and did not attend meetings
2. If judicial officers participated in the meetings, do you agree with the following statements
about judicial officer participation:
n/a
a. JUDICIAL OFFICER PARTICIPATION WAS ESSENTIAL IN UNDERSTANDING
ISSUES GROUP WAS ASKED TO ADDRESS
Agree

Strongly
Agree

85 (43.8%)

68 (35.1%)

Disagree

21(10.8%)

Strongly
Disagree
5 (2.6%)

Don't Know

5 (2.6%)

No Response

10 (5.2%)

b. JUDICIAL OFFICERS DOMINATED MEETINGS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

5 (2.6%)

13 (6.7%)

130 (67%)

Strongly
Disagree
34(17.5%)

Don't Know

2 (1%)

No Response

10 (5.2%)

c. ATTORNEYS WERE CANDID WHEN JUDICIAL OFFICERS WERE PRESENT
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

29(14.9%)

116(59.8%)

30(15.5%)

Strongly
Disagree
2(1%)

Don't Know

6(3.1%)

No Response

11(5.7%)

I. The Civil Justice Reform Act suggests that Advisory Groups should include "attorneys and
other persons who are representative of major categories of litigants in such court."
1. Did your Advisory Group include non-attorney litigant representatives?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don't Know
d. No Response

148
33
9
4

(76.3%)
(17%)
(4.6%)
(2.1%)
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2. If your Advisory Group included non-attorney litigant representatives, do you agree or
disagree with the following statements about their participation:
a. LITIGANT PARTICIPATION WAS HELPFUL BECAUSE IT BROUGHT AN
IMPORTANT PERSPECTIVE TO DELIBERATIONS THAT ATIORNEYS COULD
NOT PROVIDE
Strongly
Agree

Agree

24 (12.4%)

71 (36.6%)

Disagree

40(20.6%)

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

8 (4.1%)

8 (4.1%)

No Response

43 (22.2%)

b. LITIGANTS WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN RULES THAT FAVORED THEIR
INTERESTS
Strongly

Agree

Disagree

Agree
n/a

Strongly

Don't Know

No Response

19(9.8%)

45 (23.2%)

Disagree
13 (6.7%)

99 (51%)

18 (9.3%)

c. LITIGANTS DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT COURT PROCEDURES TO BE
USEFUL MEMBERS OF ADVISORY GROUP
Strongly
Agree
11(5.7%)

Agree

40 (20.6%)

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

No Response

77 (39.7%)

14 (7.2%)

9 (4.6%)

43 (22.2%)

d. LITIGANTS DO NOT PARTICIPATE BECAUSE THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND
COURT PROCEDURES
Strongly
Agree
10 (5.2%)

Agree

32 (16.5%)

Disagree

81(41.8%)

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

12(6.2%)

15 (7.7%)

No Response

44 (22.7%)

J. Do you feel that your participation in the Civil Justice Reform Advisory Group has been a
worthwhile experience? Why or why not? How could the process have been improved?
Response: 150 (21 negative; 124 positive)
I. Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan
A. Has your district adopted a Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan?
1. Yes
2. No (go to part 11)
3. Don't Know (go to part I1)
4. No Response

177
7
9
1

(91.2%)
(3.6%)
(4.6%)
( .5%)

B. If yes, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
1. THE COURT WAS OPENMINDED IN CONSIDERING THE ADVISORY GROUP
RECOMMENDATIONS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

50(25.8%)

103 (53.1%)

15 (7.7%)

Strongly
Disagree
6(3.1%)

Don't Know

3 (1.5%)

No Response

17 (8.8%)
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2. THE ADVISORY GROUP WAS TOO CAUTIOUS IN ITS APPROACH TO REFORM
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

4(2.1%)

30 (15.5%)

118 (60.8%)

Strongly
Disagree
22 (11.3%)

Don't Know

No Response

4(2.1%)

16 (8.2%)

3. MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY GROUP REPRESENTED THEIR OWN INTERESTS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

6 (3.1%)

43 (22.2%)

105 (54.1%)

19 (9.8%)

4 (2.1%)

No Response

17 (8.8%)

4. MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY GROUP WERE A DIVERSE GROUP OF PRACTI
TIONERS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

53 (27.3%)

113 (58.2%)

7(3.6%)

3(1.5%)

1 (.5%)

No Response

17(8.8%)

5. LITIGANTS' INTERESTS WERE WELL-REPRESENTED ON THE ADVISORY GROUP
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

39(20.1%)

100(51.5%)

21(10.8%)

Strongly
Disagree

8 (4.1%)

Don't Know

9 (4.6%)

No Response

17(8.8%)

6. 1 AGREE WITH MOST OF THE ADVISORY GROUP'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Don't Know

48(24.7%)

113 (58.2%)

10(5.2%)

1 (.5%)

4(2.1%)

III. Demographic Information:
A. Are you an attorney?
1. Yes
2. No

(92.8%)
180
(7.2%)
14
b I. If no, what is your job?

(If you answered yes, please complete the rest of this section)
B. How long have you been in practice?
1.
2.
3.

over 20 years
over 10 years
over 5 years

90 (46.4%)
70(36.1%)
12(6.2%)

No Response

18(9.3%)
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5.

under 5 years
no response
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i ( .5%)
21(10.8%)

C. What is the nature of your practice?
1. Law Firm
a.
b.
C.

d.
e.

f.

Size of firm:

over 100 attorneys
over 50 attorneys
over 20 attorneys
over 10 attorneys
under 10 attorneys

21(10.8%)
12(6.2%)
17(8.8%)
18(9.3%)
51(26.3%)

2. Government
a. Judicial Officer
a. Federal
b. State
b. Court Clerk
c. Other Court Personnel
d. United States Attorneys Office
e. Other

(5.2%)
(.5%)
(2.6%)
(2.6%)
(.5%)
(4.1%)

3. Corporate

5

(2.6%)

4. Public Interest/Legal Services

4

(2.1%)

5. Academic

11

(5.7%)

6. Other (specify)

3

(1.5%)

D. If you are in private practice, what is the predominate nature of your practice?

1. bankruptcy
5
2. corporate/banking/business
13
3. criminal
8
4. family
2
5. general civil litigation
91
6. immigration
0
7. labor/employment
18
8. municipal
0
9. natural resources/environmental
3
10. patent/trademark/copyright
3
11. probate and trusts
9
12. real estate
7
13. taxation
4
14. torts and insurance
32
15. other (specify)
antitrust
2
civil rights
6
E. If you are in private civil practice, do you represent

1. primarily plaintiffs
2. primarily defendants
3. about the same
4. no response

(2.6%)
(6.7%)
(4.1%)
(1%)
(46.9%)
( 0%)
(9.3%)
( 0%)
(1.5%)
(1.5%)
(4.6%)
(3.6%)
(2.1%)
(16.5%)
(1%)
(3.1%)

(20.6%)
(24.7%)
(19.1%)
(35.6%)
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F. Approximately what percentage of your cases are filed in federal court?
G. Other Service Activities (check all that apply)

1. Serve
2. Serve
3. Serve
4. Serve

(62.4%)
(27.8%)
(40.7%)
(20.1%)

on local or state bar committees
on national bar committees
on other court committees
on District Court's Local Rules Committee

H. Did you serve as a judicial law clerk?
1. Yes,
2. Yes,
3. Yes,
4. Yes,
5. No

at a federal trial court in this district.
at a federal trial court in another district.
at a federal appellate court.
at a state court.

I. What is your gender?

1.female
2. male
3. no responses

(17%)
(75.8%)
(7.2%)

J. What is your race/ethnic group [response not reported] ?
1. Black/African-American
2. Hispanic/Latino
3. Native American/Indian
4. White/Caucasian
5. Other (Asian-American)

6
3

3.1%
1.5%

170
2

86.7%
1.0%

22
4
7

(11.3%)
(2.1%)
(3.6%)

13
121

(6.7%)
(62.4%)

